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ABSTRACT 
Business rescue is a corporate rescue system in South African law that has replaced 
judicial management. An applicant in a business rescue application in terms of section 
131 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 has to satisfy the court that there is a ‘reasonable 
prospect of success.’  This term has existed in South African law before the enactment 
of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 but judicial attention in giving effect to this term has 
been centered around judicial managements failure. This study recognizes that judicial 
management is a failure and proposes a new approach that is completely divested 
from judicial management. The first part of the study examines the way in which the 
judiciary has approached interpreting ‘reasonable prospects’ by critically analyzing the 
sources the courts have used and conclusions reached. The study breaks down the 
judiciaries attitude and approaches to 3 different cases which are classified as first, 
second and third generation cases. The study argues that if business rescue is to be 
successful then the Companies Act 71 of 2008 should be amended or a new fourth 
generation of cases need to adopt a liberal approach to ‘reasonable prospects’ by 
considering the previous jurisprudence on this term as well as relying on the 
procedural safeguards in Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 BACKGROUND OF STUDY  
The role of company law is to provide a stable platform for economic activity to take 
place.1 A part of this includes providing safeguards against commercial death such as 
compromises with creditors and rescue regimes.2 The rationale for these corporate 
rescue regimes is aimed at allowing a company to continue to exist and maintain its 
role in the corporate ecosystem. The system of rescuing or reorganizing an ailing entity 
operates as a lifeline that provides a hibernation from creditors enforcing their claims.3 
While the creditors rights to claim are limited the company continues to operate as 
opposed to the immediate liquidation which has the potential to cause an imbalance 
and knock on effect to stakeholders of the company. The ultimate goal of business 
rescue systems is restoring an entity to solvency so that it may continue to trade in the 
market place.4  
 
South Africa’s rescue procedure is codified in Chapter 6 of the Companies Act 71 of 
2008 (hereinafter ‘the Companies Act 2008’) which has been created to replace the 
old system of judicial management. A variety of stakeholders from academics to 
owners of companies have eagerly awaited and welcomed this change in our law. This 
is due to the failure of the judicial management system which was seen as expensive, 
out dated and counterproductive. Corporate rescue mechanisms are aimed at 
preventing liquidations and it often was the case that judicial management was simply 
a stepping stone to liquidation.5 
                                               
1 South African Dept. of Trade and Industry Policy Paper: Company Law for the 21st Century Guidelines for 
Corporate law reform. GN 1183 in GG 26493 of 23 June 2004. 
2 Companies Act 71 of 2008: s7. 
3 Companies Act 71 of 2008: s133.  
4 Companies Act 71 of 2008: s128(b)(iii). 
5 R, Bradstreet ‘Business Rescue Proves to Be Creditor-Friendly: CJ Claassens J’s Analysis of the New Business 
Rescue Procedure in Oakdene, Square Properties’ (2013) 130 South African Law Journal 44-52. 
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The buildup to the enactment of chapter 6 of the Companies Act 2008 was no small 
feat and there had been plenty of time from the introduction of judicial management in 
1926 to 2011 for the legislature to create a workable and pragmatic approach to 
corporate rescue in South Africa.6 The legislature considered various laws in an 
attempt to be on par with leading foreign jurisdictions such as America, Australia and 
England.7 On the 1st of May 2011 business rescue was born into our legislation and 
with it came a new heap of problems. Some of these problems were foreseeable and 
others could have been foreseeable due to the repeating of certain elements of judicial 
management and by examining comparative jurisdictions mechanisms.   
 
One of the shortcomings of judicial management was that it placed too high a burden 
on an applicant to discharge. This has subsequently been changed for business 
rescue.8 An applicant under judicial management would have to prove to the court that 
there exists a reasonable probability that the company can be rescued, compared to 
the lower threshold of reasonable prospects in business rescue applications.9 
However, as I have alluded to previously that some of the mistakes of judicial 
management have been repeated, one of these, is the lack of a comprehensive 
definition of the recovery requirement.10 The legislature’s failure to define what 
reasonable prospects are, have led to the courts inheriting this duty. This study 
involves analyzing the way in which the courts have applied this duty.  
                                               
6 Companies Act 46 of 1926. 
7 South African Dept. of Trade and Industry Policy Paper: Company Law for the 21st Century Guidelines for 
Corporate law reform. GN 1183 in GG 26493 of 23 June 2004.  
8 Companies Act 61 of 1973: s427. 
9 Companies Act 71 of 2008: s131. 
10 Southern Palace Investments 265 (Pty) Ltd v Midnight Storm 386 (Pty) Ltd 2012 (2) SA 423 (WCC).  
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1.2 PURPOSE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
The purpose of the study is to critically analyze the court’s discretion when deciding 
business rescue applications when a company is in liquidation. The study is significant 
because it evaluates whether courts should adopt a liberal approach towards deciding 
whether there are reasonable prospects of a company being rescued or follow a strict 
inflexible approach. The ultimate aim is to decipher what the courts require of an 
applicant to prove a company has reasonable prospects while in liquidation and 
whether this approach is correct.  
 
1.3 METHODOLOGY 
This thesis adopts the comparative method of research to critically analyze judicial 
interpretation and attention when adjudicating over business rescue applications. 
Particular emphasis will be placed on reasonable prospects after a final order of 
liquidation has been granted and what role judicial interpretation has played in adding 
substance to the framework established in chapter 6 of the Companies Act 2008. The 
research has adopted a doctrinal approach through locating and analysing relevant 
legislation, academic writing and case law with particular emphasis on the Richter v 
ABSA case.11 This case deals with a successful business rescue application brought 
6 months after a final order of liquidation had been granted.12 One of the points in 
opposition was that if the court were to adopt such a liberal approach to business 
rescue applications it would lead to various avenues which allowed persons to abuse 
this mechanism.13 Although the court had made a finding on this point I intend to 
examine this issue by considering the effects and consequences of the court adopting 
                                               
11 Richter v ABSA Bank Limited (20181/2014) [2015] ZASCA 100. 
12 Richter supra note 11 at 2. 
13 Richter supra note 11 at 16. 
 
 
9 
 
a liberal interpretation and approach. A part of this study will be based on determining 
whether the reasonable prospect test is objective or subjective and whether it applies 
in the same way to all companies and at all times during financial distress.14  
 
I will defend the view that the Companies Act 2008 supports a liberal interpretation 
and that there exists no absolute bar on business rescue applications being granted 
after a lengthy period has lapsed. Whilst courts must treat business rescue 
applications after a final order with caution, there exists no rubicon that prevents an 
applicant from applying before the Master of the High Court issues a certificate in the 
Government Gazette that the company has been dissolved. This study involves 
comparing the external effects of a court adopting a liberal interpretation by comparing 
the effect on third parties such as creditors and liquidators and weighing up the 
competing interests against the objectives of business rescue to determine whether a 
liberal interpretation is feasible. I will defend the view that the new business rescue 
regime has changed the corporate landscape which was creditor friendly and is now 
debtor friendly whilst maintaining that this does not necessarily mean it is creditor 
unfriendly.15 
 
1.4 LITERATURE REVIEW  
Business rescue has been termed a new baby in our law which implies that it needs 
to grow and develop.16 This has led to various writers and critics offering a variety of 
perspectives on its operations and effects. The new regime is much broader than 
                                               
14 EP, Joubert ‘Reasonable possibility versus reasonable prospects: Did business rescue succeed in creating a 
better test than judicial management?’ (2013) 76 Journal of Contemporary -Dutch law 550-563. 
15 Bradstreet op cit note 5 at 44-53.  
16 Merchant West Working Capital Solutions (Pty) Ltd v Advanced Technologies and Engineering Company (Pty) 
Ltd and Another (13/12409) [2013] ZAGPHC 109. 
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judicial management and refers to an affected person being able to approach the court 
to seek an order for compulsory business rescue. The persons which fall under this 
category of affected person are employees, directors and trade unions who are just a 
few that are vested with locus standi in a business rescue application. This has led to 
many writers focusing on the interests of a particular group, for example Bradstreet 
and Loubser are notable academics in this area of law and have published works, 
examining the role and effects on shareholders during business rescue. Bradstreet 
argues that business rescue should be attractive to creditors of large companies in 
financial distress more so than smaller companies given the costs associated with 
business rescue. Loubser argues that business rescue offers protection of employees 
but the definition of business rescue fails to make one of the objectives of the regime 
to preserve jobs 17  
 
1.4.1 SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES AND EMPLOYMENT PERSPECTIVE  
 
The social consequences and employment perspective has also been widely written 
on and writers have contributed in determining where each affected persons fit in, what 
role they play in business rescue and how their rights are affected when a company is 
in business rescue.18 The comparison between judicial management and business 
rescue has sparked debate ever since the proposal of a new rescue mechanism was 
tabled and many writers have offered valuable historic perspectives that grasps the 
way in which South African law has changed from 1926 to 2011.19  
 
                                               
17 R, Bradstreet ‘The New Business Rescue: Will Creditors Sink or Swim’ (2011) 128 SALJ 352-380 and A, 
Loubser ‘The Role of Shareholders during Corporate Rescue Proceedings: Always on the outside Looking in 
(2008) 20 SA MERC 372-390. 
18 A, Loubser ‘The role of trade unions and employees in South Africa’s business rescue proceedings (2015) 36 
ILJ 21-39. 
19 Joubert op cite note 14. 
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It is accepted that where a company is placed under a business rescue the statutory 
moratorium automatically comes into place for the company only.20 This has provided 
clarity in cases where a surety unsuccessfully attempted to argue that a moratorium 
also applied to sureties of a company under business rescue where a creditor sort to 
enforce their claim.21 Therefore the perspective of sureties has also been well 
documented on in case law and I will not be examining this aspect.22 
 
The operation of the moratorium and its limitation of a creditor’s rights to enforce their 
claim against the company has also been decided in case law. The legislature has 
established a clear procedure where a creditor seeks leave from the court to institute 
legal proceedings against a company, and in certain situations a separate application 
need not be made.23 This means that the issue of leave to proceed can be dealt with 
as a point in limine together with the legal proceedings.24 The courts have also been 
tasked with determining whether leave to proceed can be granted retrospectively and 
there have been conflicting judgements in this regard.25 There are certain areas that 
have unanswered questions of what exactly constitutes legal proceedings but I do not 
intend to analyze this area.26  
 
1.4.2 THE ROLE OF THE BUSINESS RESCUE PRACTITIONER  
 
                                               
20 Companies Act 71 of 2008: s133. 
21 Investec Bank Ltd v Bruyns 2012 (5) SA 430 (WCC) and First Rand Bank Ltd t/a RMB Private Bank v Nagel 
(2013) ZAGPJHC 200. 
22 Newport Finance Company (Pty) Ltd t/a Balanced Audio v Greef and Another 2014 (4) SA 521 (WCC). 
23 Resource Washing (Pty) Ltd v Zululand Coal Reclaimers Proprietary Limited and Others (10862/14) [2015] 
ZAKZNPHC 21. 
24 Booysen v Jonkheer Boerewynmakery (Pty) Ltd and Another 2017 (4) SA 51 (WCC). 
25 Merchant West Working Capital Solutions (Pty) Ltd v Advanced Technologies and Engineering Company (Pty) 
Ltd and Another (13/12409) [2013] ZAGPHC 109 (10 May 2013), Redpath Mining South Africa (Pty) Ltd v 
Marsden N.O. & Others [2013] ZAGPJHC 148. 
26 Chetty t/a Nationwide Electrical v Hart and Another 2015 (6) SA 424 (SCA). And National Union of 
Metalworkers of SA obo Members v Motho Steel Engineering CC [2014] JOL 32257 (LC). 
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The perspective of business rescue practitioners and the duties placed upon them 
have also been discussed. This area has led to writers criticizing the lack of regulations 
governing business rescue practitioners and how this may hamper the objectives of 
business rescue.27 Courts have already decided that business rescue practitioners 
owe a fiduciary duty towards the company and their actions must be aimed at the best 
interests of the company or they can be removed.28 The ways in which a director and 
business rescue practitioner abused the system was adequately dealt with in Griessell 
and Another v Lizemore and Others 29  Where a business rescue practitioner fails to 
comply with the procedures set out in the Companies Act 2008 with regards to notice 
to creditors and failing to adopt a business rescue plan have already been decided.30  
 
1.4.3 ABUSE OF PROCESS 
 
The idea of corporate rescue is not a new one and one will struggle to find a jurisdiction 
without a rescue regime and this had led to many comparative contributions that 
examine South Africa’s systems against a foreign system.31 Many cases have dealt 
with the issue of business rescue with parties arguing that business rescue 
applications are an abuse of process.32 These arguments are often seen in cases 
where a provisional order of liquidation has already been granted and on the return 
date the company files a business rescue application and the liquidation application is 
suspended.33 Where there is a winding up application and a subsequent business 
                                               
27 R, Bradstreet ‘The Leak in Chapter 6 Lifeboat: Inadequate Regulation of Business Rescue Practitioners May 
Adversely Affect Lenders Willingness and the Growth of the Economy’ (2010) 22 SA MERC  195-213. 
28  2016 (6) SA 236 (GJ). 
29 Lizemore supra note 28. 
30 Z, Buba “Possible consequences of the failure of an adopted business rescue plan’ (2017) De Rebus 20 and 
Lizemore supra note 28. 
31 H, Stroop and A, Hutchison ‘Post commencement Finance – Domiciled Resident or Uneasy Foreign Transplant” 
(2017) 20 PER 1-41. 
32 Gormley v West City Precinct Properties (Pty) Ltd and Another v West City Precinct Properties (Pty) Ltd and 
Another (19075/11,15584/11) [2012] ZAWCHC 33. 
33 Standard Bank of South Africa Limited v Gas 2 liquids (Pty) Limited 2017 (2) SA 56 (GJ). 
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rescue application they are usually consolidated and heard together as a court is 
empowered to dismiss the business rescue application and order the company be 
wound up.34 These types of practical examples have already been decided and the 
legislature and courts agree that business rescue is preferred over liquidation if it is 
applicable.35 While it is accepted that business rescue proceedings suspend 
liquidation proceedings, there have been conflicting judgments on its practical 
application. The courts have had to decide what liquidation proceedings are, when 
they begin and when a business rescue application is made.36 These two issues have 
already been decided and that is why I intend to conduct my research on business 
rescue after a company is in liquidation.  
 
1.5 FOCUS OF THE STUDY AND PRIMARY RESEARCH AREA  
The study has been narrowed down to cater for a very specific instance given the vast 
array of areas that have already been covered in existing literature. Business rescue 
might be a new concept, but it has been heavily written about. This study breaks down 
the different stages of business rescue to focus only on instances where a company 
is in liquidation and then seeks to apply for business rescue. The existing literature 
often looks at a specific requirement in section 131 of the Companies Act 2008 such 
as financial distress or a specific perspective of an affected person such as a creditor. 
This study differs as it looks at the recovery requirement only in the context of a 
company that has begun being wound up. This study analyses the consequences that 
occur when a company in liquidation is placed in business rescue and uses this 
                                               
34 Nedbank Ltd v Bestvest 153 (Pty) Ltd; Essa and Another v Bestvest (Pty) Ltd and Others 2012 (5) SA 497 
(WCC). 
35 Blue Star Holdings (Pty) Ltd v West Coast Oyster Growers CC  2013 (6) SA 540 (WCC). 
36 Engen Petroleum Ltd v Multi Waste (Pty) Ltd and Others 2013 (5) SA 596 (GSJ), Absa Bank Limited v Summer 
lodge (Pty) Ltd [2013] ZAGPPHC, Taboo Trading 232 (Pty) Ltd v Pro Wreck Scrap Metal cc and Others 2013 
(6) SA 141 KZNP. 
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research as a factor to determine whether the courts should adopt a liberal 
interpretation of the term reasonable prospect.  
 
1.6 OVERVIEW OF CHAPTERS 
This study consists of four content parts with the first and second parts being the 
theoretical and historic aspect which introduces the applicable laws that apply to 
business rescue and how it has been developed. The third part will consist of analyzing 
existing cases and articles and lastly the conclusion will take the form of establishing 
a set of triggers and factors that should be used as a guideline when determining a 
business rescue application for a company in liquidation.  
   
The first content chapter will introduce the framework governing business rescue and 
an interpretation of their meaning by the courts. This chapter distinguishes between 
first, second and third generation business rescue cases. Much of this chapter will 
focus on the proper meaning of reasonable prospects and what sources courts have 
used when interpreting its meaning. The last part of this chapter will be an overview of 
the Richter v ABSA judgment as all chapters will refer to parts of this case.37 
 
The second chapter will focus on what are reasonable prospects for a company in 
liquidation. This chapter will consider the usefulness of other sources that deal with 
the term ‘reasonable prospects’ and will refer back to appellate division cases and 
appeal cases that have also analyzed this term.    
 
                                               
37 Richter supra note 11. 
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The consequences of adopting a liberal approach will be dealt with in the third content 
chapter. This chapter will look at what happens to a liquidator during business rescue 
and how claims are ranked? The third chapter will also examine who is in control of a 
company in liquidation that has filed an application for business rescue suspending 
the liquidation, but that application has not yet been heard or decided. The last part of 
this chapter will look at whether subsequent business rescue applications can be 
brought and whether the failure of the board of directors to voluntary adopt a resolution 
to commence business rescue should be used as a factor against granting a court 
order to commence business rescue.  
 
The concluding chapter will make recommendations as to why the Companies Act 
2008 should be amended to allow for a guiding provision that will direct the courts in 
establishing a clear and coherent standard for reasonable prospects. 
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CHAPTER 2: FRAMEWORK OF BUSINESS RESCUE  
2.1 THE COMPANIES ACT OF 2008 
The Companies Act of 2008 introduces the concept of business rescue and chapter 6 
of this act (hereinafter referred to as chapter 6) has been described as the legislative 
template of corporate rescue in South Africa by Bradstreet.38 The rationale for chapter 
6 is to rescue a financially distressed company and the meaning of rescuing a 
company has either one of two objectives.39 These objectives are found in the 
definition of business rescue and relate to either; restoring the company to a solvent 
entity or if that is not possible then a better return for creditors or shareholders as 
opposed to liquidation.40 This indicates the legislature’s intention at the start of chapter 
6 to prefer business rescue over liquidation. The legislature expressly deals with the 
relationship between liquidation and business rescue by stating that if liquidation 
proceedings have already commenced those proceedings are suspended at the time 
the business rescue application is made.41  The ways in which business rescue can 
commence are by special resolution or court order.42 The latter option will only be 
discussed.  
 
2.1.1 COURT ORDERS TO BEGIN BUSINESS RESCUE  
An affected person is capable of applying to court for an order placing a company 
under business rescue.43 This can be done at any time so long as the company has 
not already filed a special resolution to commence business rescue.44 The definition 
                                               
38 Bradstreet op cit note 17 at 352-380. 
39 Companies Act 71 of 2008: S128(h). 
40 Companies Act 71 of 2008: S128(b)(iii). 
41 Companies Act 71 of 2008: S131(6). 
42 Companies Act 71 of 2008: S129 and S131. 
43 Companies Act 71 of 2008: S131. 
44 Companies Act 71 of 2008: S131. 
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of an affected person include a shareholder, director, registered trade union, 
employees or the employee’s representative.45 This has broadened the scope of 
business rescue from judicial management as it grants more people the opportunity to 
apply for business rescue.46 Previously only the company, its creditors or one or more 
of its members had locus standi under judicial management.47  
 
2.1.2 THE REQUIREMENTS AN AFFECTED PERSON HAS TO PROVE 
Section 131(4)(a) requires an affected person to prove that: 
1. the company is financially distressed;  
2. the company has failed to pay over any amount in terms of an obligation 
under or in terms of a public regulation, or contract, with respect to 
employment-related matters; or  
3. it is otherwise just and equitable to do so for financial reasons, and 
4. there is a reasonable prospect for rescuing the company.48 
 
Even when all these requirements are proved the court still has an overriding 
discretion whether to grant the application, dismiss it or place the company under 
liquidation.49  
 
2.2 THE MEANING OF REASONABLE PROSPECTS  
There is a general acceptance by academics and judges that the meaning of what 
reasonable prospects actually entails has not yet been adequately determined.50 
                                               
45 Companies Act 71 of 2008: S128 (a). 
46 Companies Act 61 of 1973: S427. 
47 Companies Act 61 of 1973: S346. 
48 Companies Act 71 of 2008: S131. 
49 Companies Act 71 of 2008: use of the word “may” in S131 (4)(a). 
50 Newcity Group (Pty) Ltd v Allan Pellow NO (577/2013) [2014] ZASCA 162. 
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There currently exists an array of different interpretations and even more 
commentaries and critiques on these interpretations. Some writers such as Osade 
argue that one of the biggest downfalls of judicial management was the courts attitude 
towards it and more specifically the judicial interpretation of reasonable probability. He 
further argues that should business rescue have any chance of success it would 
require the courts to adopt a new fresh attitude that is flexible and unlike the approach 
used to interpret judicial managements requirements.51 
 
The chronology of reasonable prospects in business rescue can be traced back to 
Swart v Beagle Run Investments 25 (Pty) Ltd and Others52 which was the first case to 
deal with business rescue.53 However, one of the most notable cases that has set the 
standard for reasonable prospects is Southern Palace Investments 265 (Pty) Ltd v 
Midnight Storm Investments 386 Ltd54. This case can be seen as representing the 
majority of decisions dealing with business rescue during its first generation as it set 
a benchmark for the evidentiary burden that was followed as precedent when 
determining reasonable prospects.55  
 
2.2.1 SOUTHERN PALACE INVESTMENTS 265 (PTY) LTD V MIDNIGHT STORM 
INVESTMENTS 386 LTD 
Justice Eloff AJ, in casu attempted to create a sort of checklist approach when 
determining what reasonable prospects are.56 He recognized the differences between 
                                               
51 P, Osade ‘Judicial Implementation of South Africa’s new Business Rescue Model: A Preliminary Assessment’ 
(2015) 4 Penn State Journal of Law 459-488. 
52 2011 (5) SA 422.(GNP) 
53 Joubert op cit note 14. 
54 2012 (2) SA 423 (WCC) 
55 Southern Palace Supra note 10. 
56 Southern Palace Supra note 10 at 24. 
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the test for the recovery requirement in judicial management and that in business 
rescue which was somewhat lower.57 The only problem was that this case had the 
effect of setting the bar higher than the previous standard. Another criticism of this 
case was that it required a concrete plan to be placed before it which the court can 
inspect. This is not a requirement of the Companies Act of 2008, in fact chapter 6 
specifically requires a business rescue plan to be adopted after business rescue has 
commenced as it is the duty of the business rescue practitioner and not the applicant 
or court.58  
 
The checklist approach was divided into two categories. First, dealing with the primary 
objective of business rescue which was to restore the company to solvency and the 
second dealing with a better return for creditors and shareholders. Where an affected 
person relied on the primary objective Eloff AJ required an applicant to provide 
concrete and objective details regarding: 
 
1. The likely costs of rendering the company able to commence with its intended 
business, or to resume the conduct of its core business; 
2. the likely availability of the necessary cash resource in order to enable the ailing 
company to meet its day-to-day expenditure, once its trading operations 
commence or are resumed. If the company will be reliant on loan capital or 
other facilities, one would expect to be given some concrete indication of the 
extent thereof and the basis or terms upon which it will be available; 
                                               
57 Southern Palace Supra note 10 at 21. 
58 Companies Act 71 of 2008: S140(d). 
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3. the availability of any other necessary resource, such as raw materials and 
human capital; 
4. the reasons why it is suggested that the proposed business plan will have a 
reasonable prospect of success.59 
 
It is quite clear from this list that the evidentiary burden placed on an applicant is 
strenuous and many of the requirements need details and information that may not be 
readily available to an ‘affected person.’ 
 
Where an applicant relied on the secondary objective of business rescue they were 
required to provide concrete factual details of the: 
1. Source, nature and extent of the resources that are likely to be available to the 
company; 
2. The basis and terms on which such resources will be available.60  
 
Both of these checklists are qualified by the fact that mere speculation will not suffice. 
This however is problematic and inconsistent with some of the requirements. For 
example, the requirement that there must be details on the resources that are likely to 
be available can only be speculated upon. Therefore, by asking the applicant for a 
plan to be placed before the court will require an amount of speculation as it deals with 
the future.61 It is assumed that this speculation must be backed up and be reasonable. 
For example, where one alleges that the company is expecting a big order there must 
be some sort of correspondence to back up this expectation. 
                                               
59 Southern Palace supra note 10 at 24. 
60 Southern Palace Supra note 10 at 25. 
61 Southern Palace Supra note 10 at 23. 
 
 
21 
 
 
This case attempted to create a system or to formulate a test because the framework 
failed to do so. Had subsequent cases given effect to the directions that an applicant 
is required to deal with why the company was in financial distress and propose a 
workable remedy that might have a reasonable prospect of success, then perhaps the 
first generation of cases relying on Eloff’s judgment would have had a different 
outcome. The way in which Eloff AJ attempted to create a test was correct and he 
even commented on how each case must be dealt with on its own merits but the end 
result was simply too burdensome on an applicant.  
 
2.2.2 OAKDENE SQUARE PROPERTIES (PTY) LTD V FARM BOTHASFONTEIN 
(KYLAMI) (PTY) LTD 
The next generation of cases dealing with the meaning reasonable prospects can be 
summed up in Oakdene Square Properties (Pty) Ltd v Farm Bothasfontein (Kylami) 
(Pty).62 This was the first time the Supreme Court of Appeal (hereinafter referred to as 
the SCA) was asked to decide on an issue concerning business rescue.63 The case 
dealt with the sale of a property and whether a better return could be obtained under 
business rescue as opposed to a forced sale in execution.64 This case recognized the 
need for a lower threshold and attempted to simplify the determination of reasonable 
prospects. The court determined the extent of its discretion and the way it should be 
exercised. Its finding was that the courts should not exercise a strict discretion but a 
loose and flexible one.65 This allows the court to take into account a wide range of 
factors and come to a value judgement on whether there are reasonable prospects. In 
                                               
62 Oakdene Square Properties (Pty) Ltd v Farm Bothasfontein (Kylami) (Pty) Ltd (609/2012) [2013] ZASCA 68. 
63 Oakdene supra note 60 at 5. 
64 Oakdene supra note 60 at 15. 
65 Oakdene supra note 60 at 19. 
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making this determination the court reasoned that the answer to whether there exists 
reasonable prospects is either a yes or a no and there is no middle ground where both 
answers could be correct.66 The court was asked to rule on where reasonable 
prospects must stem from, as the appellants argued that all that was required was a 
reasonable prospect of a rescue plan. This interpretation was rejected by the SCA 
who followed the view that when interpreting reasonable prospects one must rely on 
one of the goals listed in s128(1)(b).67  
 
The SCA set the bar lower than it previously was by requiring something more of a 
prima facie case or arguable possibility.68 The courts directions are for courts to focus 
on the reasonable part of reasonable prospects meaning the prospects must be based 
on reasonable grounds.69 The SCA rejected the view that there should be a checklist 
approach and held that it would be impractical to specify the way in which an applicant 
should show reasonable prospects.70 However, in this case the court relied on factors 
such as the costs of business rescue in comparison to liquidator’s fees. The appellants 
contended that a business rescue practitioner would be able to sell the property at a 
higher rate but the court rejected this at it failed to understand why. The factors relied 
on by the SCA in rejecting the application was that a liquidator gets paid a percentage 
of the value of the estate and a business rescue practitioner gets paid a daily rate.71 
This means the longer business rescue continues would mean it would become more 
expensive and would eventually result in the same value as a forced sale given the 
additional costs associated to business rescue. Another factor that was considered 
                                               
66 Oakdene supra note 60 at 21. 
67 Oakdene supra note 60 at 31. 
68 Oakdene supra note 60 at 29. 
69 Oakdene supra note 60 at 29. 
70 Oakdene supra note 60 at 30. 
71 Oakdene supra note 60 at 34. 
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was that some of the creditors intended to oppose a business rescue plan, therefore 
even if the courts were to order business rescue the voting interest of the two creditors 
would be 60% at the meeting of creditors. This meant that they would object to the 
business rescue plan being adopted when the business rescue practitioner convenes 
a meeting of creditors if business rescue was ordered. The court expressly dealt with 
whether this point should be considered at this stage and it held that it should be 
because ordering business rescue would be futile if the creditors have already 
displayed their intention to object to the adoption of the plan.72 
 
2.3 BACKGROUND OF RICHTER V ABSA BANK LIMITED  
A company was placed in liquidation even though at the hearing it was contended 
business rescue would be a more viable option.73 The court however ordered the final 
order to wind up the entity. The entity was a property holding close corporation and its 
income was from rentals as it leased out commercial property.74 After liquidators were 
appointed and the winding up process had begun an employee had launched business 
rescue proceedings. He relied on the fact that he was an affected person in that he 
was an employee and the court a quo held he did have locus standi.75 ABSA’s 
argument was that the entity could no longer apply for business rescue as the final 
order of liquidation had already been granted. ABSA’s view was that there can be 
reasonable prospect of success when the liquidation order was granted 6 months prior 
to the business rescue application.76  
 
                                               
72 Oakdene supra note 60 at 38. 
73 Richter supra note 11 at 2. 
74 Richter supra note 11 at 2. 
75 Richter supra note 11 at 2. 
76 Richter supra note 11 at 4. 
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The High Court held that the company was not capable of business rescue as it was 
in liquidation and this decision was taken on appeal to the SCA. The issue that had to 
be determined was the proper meaning of ‘liquidation proceedings’ and whether it 
referred to only the period before a final order or included the period after the final 
order of liquidation was granted.77 The court looked at the wording of s131 (1) which 
states: “an affected person may apply to a court at ‘any time’ for an order placing the 
company under supervision and commencing business rescue proceedings”.78 
The court emphasised the use of the words any time in s131 (1) as well in s131 (7) 
which states: “a court may make an order contemplated in subsection (4), or (5) if 
applicable, at any time during the course of any liquidation proceedings”79 
 
The SCA relied on these two provisions to come to the conclusion that the legislature 
clearly intended business rescue to be preferable over liquidation and did not 
distinguish between pre and post final liquidation.80 The SCA had criticised the High 
Court’s view that the entity ceases to exist once a final order of liquidation had been 
granted and held the company was very much in existence, the only change was the 
control of the company.81 The court considered whether liquidation meant prior to 
winding up because it often regarded the process after a final liquidation order had 
been granted as the winding up of a company but the SCA was of the view that the 
terms are used interchangeably and liquidation includes the process of winding the 
assets by a liquidator.82 
 
                                               
77 Richter supra note 11 at 8. 
78 Companies Act 71 of 2008: s131(1). 
79 Companies Act 71 of 2008: s131(7) 
80 Richter supra note 11 at 17. 
81 Richter supra note 11 at 10. 
82 Richter supra note 11 at 11. 
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The SCA examined what constitutes reasonable prospects when a company is in 
liquidation and listed the following as possible indicators of reasonable prospects:  
1. Being awarded a tender in liquidation which was applied for prior to liquidation; 
2. being awarded a contract;  
3. securing funding for a project; and 
4. a creditor indicating a willingness to subordinate its claim.83 
The court was of the view that reasonable prospects will exist during liquidation where 
there is evidence that ‘business rescue will yield a better return for creditor or 
shareholder and jobs can be retained.’84  
 
The court noted that by upholding the appeal it would lead to awkward results during 
the early stages of business rescue.85 For example, what happens to the liquidators 
and who controls the company leading up to the court’s decision on the business 
rescue application? The SCA was of the view that these impractical consequences 
should not be considered by a court as reasons to deny placing a company under 
business rescue.86 The court took the approach that to disallow business rescue 
applications after a final order of liquidation would be to go against the aims which 
business rescue was specifically created for.87  The main concern from ABSA’s 
counsel was that if the court allowed such a liberal interpretation of s131 it will have 
negative impacts on liquidation.88 It is against the background of this submission that 
has led to an analysis on what are the negative impacts and awkward results the court 
and ABSA are referring to. This case followed a liberal approach while aware of the 
                                               
83 Richter supra note 11 at 15. 
84 Richter supra note 11 at 15. 
85 Richter supra note 11 at 16. 
86 Richter supra note 11 at 16. 
87 Richter supra note 11 at 15. 
88 Richter supra note 11 at 16. 
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fact that it may lead to confusing practical consequences. It is these effects and 
consequences that will be looked at to determine whether a liberal approach is the 
correct approach.  
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CHAPTER 3: JURISPRUDENCE ON REASONABLE PROSPECTS 
3.1 SUBSTANTIVE REASONING  
In 1996, Alfred Cockrell 89 undertook a study where he analyzed the way in which 
South Africa’s Constitutional Court reasoned during its first year in operation. In this 
study he argued that giving effect to the new broad-based value-oriented Constitution 
demanded a new style of substantive reasoning. He argued that the judiciary would 
have to undertake a new approach that shy’s away from the mechanical application of 
rules. This new approach would require greater room for judicial discretion and 
pragmatic thinking in applying same.  It was this discretion of the judiciary that he 
focused on. Cockrell argued that this discretion afforded to the judiciary was due to 
the open-ended wording of the Constitution and its constant reference to values.90 
These Constitutional values where seen as the spirit of the Constitution and mandated 
a court or tribunal to give effect to it when interpreting law.91 
 
Cockrell distinguished between formal reasoning, which is the strict application of a 
rule and substantive reasoning which considered a variety of factors when applying 
the rules.92 His study compared the formal vision of law that took place in the English 
system and the substantive vision of law in the American system and held that South 
African law would need to shift from the formal English system towards a more 
substantive American approach.93 This required the judiciary to consider the 
implications of the rule and the purpose it was serving as well as other relevant factors.  
 
                                               
89 A Cockrell ‘Rainbow Jurisprudence’ (1996) 12 South African Journal on Human Rights 1-38. 
90 Ibid at 2. 
91 The Constitution of South Africa: S39(2). 
92 Cockrell op cite note 89 at 3. 
93 Cockrell op cite note 89 at 5. 
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The conclusion reached in Cockrell’s study was that during the first year in operation 
the Constitutional Court’s decisions were without substance or direction and contained 
‘rainbow jurisprudence.’94 This is a term coined by Cockrell that refers to an eloquent 
statement that on the face of it seems well thought out and well written, but at a second 
glance offers no real substance. He argued that this often occurred in first generation 
Constitutional Court cases because judges were tasked with building constitutional 
jurisprudence from nothing and this led to the repetition of what was required of the 
courts as opposed to the courts stating how it is going to achieve what was required.95 
This approach is comparable to first generation business rescue cases because the 
courts have recognized that ‘reasonable prospects’ demand a lower threshold than 
‘reasonable probability’ in judicial management and have constantly repeated this 
statement without actually adding any substance on how to go about achieving this 
lower threshold.  
 
In Southern Palace Investments 265 (Pty) Ltd v Midnight Storm Investments 386 LTD 
the court sought to create directions and instructions and has been heavily criticized 
for not giving effect to ‘reasonable prospects’ but at least this was an expression by 
the judiciary to create directions and instructions on what is required of an applicant.96 
To say that the applicant is required to prove something less than judicial management 
is nothing more than ‘rainbow jurisprudence.’ Eloff JA, proposed a theory on how to 
do so and for that he deserves praise even though the actual outcome of his approach 
was incorrect.97  
                                               
94 Cockrell op cite note 87 at 11. 
95 Cockrell op cite note 87 at 11. 
96 Southern Palace supra note 10 at 24. 
97 Southern Palace supra note 10 at 24. 
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Our Courts have recognized that our company law stems from the English system of 
law. Gamble J in Nedbank v Bestvest 98 in held that; 
‘Our [South African] company law has for many decades closely tracked the 
English system and has often taken its lead from the relevant English 
Companies Acts and the judicial pronouncements thereon. The Act now 
encourages our Courts to look further afield and to have regard, in appropriate 
circumstances, to other corporate law jurisdictions, be they American, 
European, Asian or African, in interpreting the Act.’99 
This case is important for South African law because it argued that a new approach to 
corporate rescue was needed, more specifically s5 and s7 required courts to consider 
foreign jurisdictions and adopt a purposive interpretation.100 South African courts have 
adopted new approaches to interpretation and there are discrepancies whether the 
statute allows discretion or not. Writers have argued that the way the courts interpret 
the bill of rights differs from interpreting ordinary statutes.101 These approaches have 
also been recognized by the judiciary who have stated that constitutional adjudication 
is value laden as opposed to interpreting a dispassionate statute such as those dealing 
with tax law.102 This clearly shows that the courts approach to a statute is linked to the 
way in which it is drafted and the provisions of chapter 6 of the Companies Act 2008 
are very purpose driven and open ended.  
 
Chapter 6 of the Companies Act 2008 is specifically aimed at achieving the objectives 
of business rescue therefore its jurisprudence must center on these two objectives. 
                                               
98 Nedbank Ltd supra note 34.  
99 Supra at 26. 
100 Nedbank Ltd supra note 34 at 25. 
101 I Currie and J De Waal. The Bill of Rights Handbook. 5ed. (2005) 145-188. 
102 S v Mhlungu and Others (CCT25/94) [1995] ZACC 4; 1995 (3) SA 86 ; 1995 (7) BCLR 793 (CC)  para 111. 
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The SCA has expressed its view that when determining reasonable prospects, we 
focus on the objectives.103 This approach is one that will give effect to the interpretation 
of a purpose-built system like chapter 6 of the Companies Act 2008. Adopting a 
purposive approach to the interpretation of business rescue applications must be done 
with caution because it deals with competing interests. However, it is still accepted 
that the best mode of interpretation in business rescue applications in a constitutional 
era is the purposive approach.104 The boundaries and the way in which this approach 
has been applied can be seen in the following extract: 
It seems to me then that a fresh approach must be adopted when assessing 
the affairs of "Corporate South Africa". The Legislature has pertinently charged 
the Courts with the duty to interpret the Act in such a way that, firstly, the 
founding values of the Constitution are respected and advanced, and, secondly 
so that the spirit and purpose of the Act are given effect to. Fundamental to the 
Act is the promotion and stimulation of the country's economy through, inter 
alia, the use of the company as a vehicle to achieve economic and social well-
being. This must be done efficiently and in accordance with acceptable levels 
of corporate stewardship, all the while, balancing the rights and obligations of 
shareholders and directors in the company, its employees and any outside 
parties with which a company ordinarily interacts in the course of its business.105 
 
Certain writers are of the view that the onus placed on an applicant to prove 
reasonable prospects are becoming less burdensome and that the courts are adopting 
                                               
103 Oakdene supra note 60 at 29. 
104 Nedbank Ltd supra note 34 at 22 
105 Nedbank Ltd supra note 34 at 20. 
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a new approach.106 The main reasoning for this lengthy transition by the courts to adopt 
or even accept a new style of reasoning can be compared to Cockrell’s study where 
the Constitutional court had to adapt from a formal approach of reasoning to a 
substantive vision of law.107 Our courts are used to the creditor friendly approach that 
has been referred to as the guillotining of a company.108 This approach protects 
creditor’s interests. Creditors are regarded as the primary concern when a company 
is in financial distress. Having said that, it is worth noting that business rescue requires 
a court to adopt a new debtor friendly approach. That now requires a court give greater 
attention to restoring the company to solvency or a better return for creditors where 
there exists a reasonable prospect. This significant change has led to the judiciary to 
be cautious and apply a step by step approach to find the perfect threshold as opposed 
to taking a gigantic leap that may have grave consequences to creditors if the bar is 
set too low all in one leap.109 
 
3.2 WHAT SOURCES SHOULD BE USED TO DETERMINE REASONABLE 
PROSPECTS   
South African courts have focused mainly on company law jurisprudence dealing with 
judicial management with some reference to foreign law. This approach is criticized 
because in one breath a court recognizes that judicial management was a failure and 
then in another uses the same approach in dealing with business rescue. In order for 
business rescue to be successful the approach adopted by the courts should be 
completely divested from judicial management. The sources to determine ‘reasonable 
                                               
106 Joubert op cite note 14 at 563. 
107 Cockrell op cite note 89 at 3. 
108 Bradstreet op cite note 17 at 1. 
109 Swart v Beagles Run Investments 25 (Pty) Ltd and Others (2011 (5) SA 422 (GNP)) [2011] ZAGPPHC 103; 
26597/2011 (30 May 2011). 
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prospects’ should be found inherently in the Companies Act 2008 read with other 
references to it in law. The term ‘reasonable prospects’ is not one that is new to South 
African law and can be traced back to appeal cases as well as applications for 
condonation. The judiciary would be aware of this because judges are faced with 
condonation applications regularly as well as applications for leave to appeal. 
However, these sources were never used as a guide when the courts examined the 
standard of proof regarding ‘reasonable prospects.’ It is generally accepted that 
condonation applications and applications for leave to appeal do not bear a very high 
burden. Specifically because they inquire about the prospects of success in the future 
based on what is before it, without adjudicating over the full appeal or case.110 The 
reason this approach should be considered is based on the fact that the Companies 
Act of 2008 contains a similar framework in that a court in terms of s131 looks at the 
prospects of success based on what’s before it and the actual investigation into 
‘reasonable prospects’ is done by the business rescue practitioner in terms of s141.111 
This is why leave to appeal and condonation cases can be of value in the sense that 
the s131 application can be seen as the application for leave to appeal or condonation 
and the actual appeal or main case is the business rescue practitioners thorough 
inquiry into reasonable prospects.112 If courts adjudicating over business rescue cases 
considered the threshold of proof that applied in these sources, then an equilibrium 
will be reached far sooner than the step by step approach that is currently taking 
place.113  
 
                                               
110 B G van der Walt ‘Applications for leave to Appeal by Persons Convicted in Criminal Cases in the Magistrates; 
Courts (1946) 64 SALJ 230. 
111 Companies Act 71 of 2008: s141. 
112 Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013: s17. 
113 Van de Walt op cit note 110. 
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3.3 THE TEST FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL AND CONDONATION 
The test for leave to appeal is dealt with in the Superior Courts Act which provides 
that;  
Leave to appeal may only be given where the judge or judges concerned are 
of the opinion that – 
(a) (i) the appeal would have a reasonable prospect of success; or  
(ii) there is some other compelling reason why the appeal should be heard, 
including conflicting judgements on the matter under consideration;  
(b) the decision sought on appeal does not fall within the ambit of section     
1(2)(a)  
(c) where the decision sought to be appealed does not dispose of all the issues  
in the case, the appeal would lead to a just and prompt resolution of the 
real issues between the parties.114 
This test was formulated from previous tests that were used in leave to appeal cases 
and it is important to understand the previous terminology that was used. The current 
study looks at the uncertainty regarding ‘reasonable prospects’ but this uncertainty 
has existed previously in leave to appeal cases where the courts had to examine what 
is meant by reasonable prospects. 
The Appellate division was tasked to hear appeals and prior to 1935 had applied the 
following test;115 
                                               
114 Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013: s17. 
115 South African Act 1909: s105. 
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1. If the appeal is on the facts, it must be manifest on the record that there has been 
a miscarriage of justice; 
2. If the appeal is based on law, the question must be an arguable one.116 
The reason I have referred to this test is founded on the fact that although the test 
does not specifically deal with reasonable prospects it has laid the foundation for 
subsequent tests and the test mentions the term ‘arguable one.’ As mentioned 
previously, the SCA requires an applicant in a business rescue application to show 
something more than a prima facie case or an arguable possibility.117 The Appellate 
Division has dealt with cases dealing with the interpretation of ‘arguable’ and the 
standard that is required to prove an arguable question of law.118 In fact the appellate 
division’s interpretation is the exact test the SCA speaks about when referring to 
arguable possibility because it summarizes the meaning as follows’ 
‘But if by arguable is meant that despite our adherence to our view already 
expressed in our judgement we are unable to characterise as impossible the 
entertainment by the Appellate Division of a different view, then the present 
case satisfied the requirement of being arguable.’119 
This test simply means that a judge who has decided a case and is adjudicating over 
an application on leave to appeal his own judgement need simply be satisfied that 
there is a arguable possibility that the Appellate Division could entertain a different 
view. This threshold is very low and could be why the SCA requires something more 
than an arguable possibility in business rescue cases. The problem with the SCA’s 
                                               
116 Rex v van Rooyen 1935 T.P.D. 
117 Oakdene supra note 60 at 29 
118 Rex v Mahomed 1939 T.P.D.    
119 Van de Walt op cit note 110. 
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judgement is that it failed to explain what an arguable possibility is and can be 
classified as rainbow jurisprudence. The only direction on what an arguable possibility 
could mean would be by examining the Appellate Division’s approach.  
The Appellate Division rejected the argument that it should appear to a court in an 
application for leave to appeal that the applicant’s appeal must be successful.120 This 
is in line with current law which holds that in an application for leave to appeal the 
court will not consider issues that are dealt with by an appeal court.121 This means that 
the question posed in leave to appeal cases that were dealt with under the 1935 
amendment, was whether there was a reasonable possibility.122  
This terminology is another problem that writers and judges are currently examining 
in business rescue cases because it has been argued that the test in s131 should 
have referred to reasonable possibility and not probability.123 Writers have interpreted 
the SCA’s approach to allow for the courts to apply discretion where there is a 
reasonable possibility and grant an order for business rescue.124 The problems that 
are currently being faced by our courts in business rescue applications can be seen 
as a repetition of the problem where courts where uncertain on what standard to apply 
in leave to appeal cases. The uncertainty was caused by an amendment in 1935 which 
meant that applications for leave to appeal will be dealt with by the Provincial Division 
of the Supreme Court and not directly by the SCA.125 This caused uncertainty on 
whether the Provincial Division applies the same standard as the Appellate Division 
                                               
120 Van de Walt op cit note 109 at 229. 
121 Greenwood v S (20075/14) [2015] ZASCA 56 (30 March 2015): para 3. 
122 General Law Amendment Act 46 of 1935. 
123 A Loubser Some Comparative Aspects of Corporate Rescue in South African Company Law (unpublished LLD 
thesis, UNISA, 2010) 340. 
124 Joubert op cite note 14 at 557. 
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or whether the test should be different. There is however clarity that the standard was 
the same for both courts as the test of ‘an arguable one’ used in Provincial Divisions 
of the Supreme Court is said to correspond with the term ‘reasonable prospect’ which 
the Appellate Division applied.126 This sort of terminology or semantical arguments 
have plagued business rescue cases causing uncertainty that was already dealt with 
and decided by the Appellate Division who faced a similar problem. Terms such as 
‘arguable’ have been used as a synonym with reasonable possibility of success as 
well as with reasonable prospects of success.  The directions by the Appellate Division 
was that all these terms flow from ‘arguable,’ which simply mean that there are 
contentions made by the Applicant that have substance.127 Therefore, the Appellate 
Divisions definition of reasonable prospects are; contentions that are backed up by 
substance. Could such a simple approach be the answer to business rescue’s 
uncertainty over reasonable prospects or would it involve the courts finding their feet 
by stepping closer and closer to reaching this inevitable liberal threshold? 
The current legislation dealing with leave to appeals specially refers to reasonable 
prospect in s17 as did the previous test which was; whether there was a reasonable 
prospect that another court may come to a different conclusion?128 It is accepted that 
the new test places a higher bar on an applicant due to the inclusion of the word 
‘would.’ The new test require 
                                               
126 Van der Walt op cit note 108 at 233 and Rex v Mahomed 1939 T.P.D.    
127 Van der Walt op cit note 108 at 232. 
128 Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Tuck 1980 (4) SA 888 (T) 890B. 
 
 
37 
 
 es that the case ‘would’ have a reasonable prospect of success as opposed to ‘may’ 
have a reasonable prospect of success.129 This shows that the test for reasonable 
prospects can be qualified but in s131 the way in which it is written is very open ended.  
There are clearly a lot of jurisprudence on reasonable prospects when examining 
business rescue applications but our courts have confined its approach to either 
looking at judicial management or working from a blank canvas. This is the wrong 
approach because ‘reasonable prospects’ are written about existentially in cases 
dealing with leave to appeals both in a civil and criminal sense.130 Cases dealing with 
absolution for instance also refer to prospects of success as well as condonation 
applications.131 The courts when determining condonation applications exercise a 
discretion after taking into account the degree of lateness, the explanation, the 
importance of the case and the prospects of success.132 It is only logical that a 
condonation application will fail where there are no prospects of success in the main 
case as it becomes futile to grant condonation. Reasonable prospects are not a new 
term in our law and our courts have given expression to this term both in a civil law 
sense and a criminal law sense. Previously criminal courts when determining 
applications for a discharge in terms of s174 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 
used to consider whether there was a reasonable possibility whether the defence’s 
case may supplement the prosecution’s case.133 This however is no longer applicable 
but the point to be taken from this is the terminology and jurisprudence on reasonable 
prospects are out there and there needs to be a shift away from judicial management 
                                               
129 Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013: s17. 
130 D Smit and S Madikizela ‘A Critical Analysis of Absolution from the Instance of South African Labour Law 
with Specific reference to the CCMA’ (2016) 79 Journal for Contemporary Roman Dutch Law 87. 
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and towards the inherent values of the Companies Act 2008 read with the above 
examples.  
3.4 IS THE TEST FOR REASONBALE PROSPECTS SUBJECTIVE OR 
OBJECTIVE AND WHAT FACTORS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED? 
The use of the word ‘reasonableness’ implies objectivity. This is evident from the other 
tests like the ‘reasonable person’ test that is used to determine negligence. The 
subjectivity arguments stem from two variables. The first variable will be the type of 
company. This can range from a property holding entity to a manufacturing-based 
entity. In a property holding entity as in Richter v ABSA134 there often is not any 
business or transactions unless the company leases its property. In a property holding 
entity there will not be as many employees as in an entity that employs staff in a 
factory. This is a basic example that shows companies in different industries and 
sectors will need a more specific test. One might suggest a reasonable based test 
similar to that of an expert where the test is what would a reasonable expert do? This 
sort of industry specific standard will require a court to look at what is reasonable for 
a company in that specific industry.135 This approach was attempted by Gamble J, in 
Nedbank v Bestvest136 where the learned judge attempted to create a checklist 
approach for the specific case which dealt with an incomplete building as the 
company’s only asset.137 The court required the applicant to set out the costs of 
finishing the construction and the accessibility of finance to do so.138 Furthermore, 
what commercial prospects can be predicted if the building were to be finalized.139 This 
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approach is flexible towards the type of company while still being able to adopt the 
purposive approach mandated by s7 of the Companies Act 2008. 
 
The second variable is the time the application is made. What might be a ‘reasonable 
prospect’ when a company has been placed in liquidation for a week, might not be so 
reasonable after a liquidator has already incurred expenses during the winding up 
period.  To illustrate the second variable, a company that relies on the primary 
objective of business rescue gets awarded a contract within a week after being placed 
in liquidation. This will bring in a profit of R100 000.00 (one hundred thousand rands). 
Therefore, there is a reasonable prospect of the company settling its debt which is 
currently at R90 000.00 (ninety thousand rands). Had this same contract been 
awarded 3 months into the winding up process, the liquidator would already have 
incurred expenses to the amount of R70 000.00 (seventy thousand rands) in addition 
to the R90 000.00 (ninety thousand rands). This makes the contract not so 
“reasonable” anymore. One can still make out a case in terms of the secondary 
objective of business rescue. Namely, that allowing the company to fulfill the contract 
will result in a better return for creditors and shareholders. This is another reason why 
business rescue can be preferred over liquidation as it allows the company to continue 
to trade even if it is just to fulfill a contract. 
 
 A problem can occur in such an example where an applicant relies on the first 
objective, but the matter should have been dealt with under the secondary objective 
and one should expect a court to apply the principal of substance over form and apply 
its discretion and grant an order in terms of the secondary objective as opposed to 
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liquidation.140 The business rescue regime has tasked a court to look at the first 
objective. If that fails, then the second objective and lastly liquidation.141 This sequence 
of events is based on a liberal interpretation as the courts require an applicant to 
specify which objective is relied on.142 However, the spirit of chapter 6 and substantive 
reasoning demands a court to make a value judgement that encompasses the overall 
purpose of business rescue. This can allow a court to grant an order for business 
rescue even when the wrong objective of business rescue was relied on so long as 
the substance is present.  
 
It is fair to say that the standard should remain, but the factors considered will differ 
from each case as well as the weight attached to those factors, depending on the 
stage of the winding up process. This means that judicial discretion is applied when 
attributing weight to the factors put forward by the applicant. By looking at case law 
applicants have put forward various factors and the most common being: 
1. The property can be sold for more than it would in a forced sale;143 
2. If a business rescue practitioner can raise post commencement finance to finish 
off current projects;144  
3. The company is awarded a contract during liquidation;145  
4. The moratorium on creditors enforcing their claims will allow the company to 
get back to solvency;146  
                                               
140 Companies Act 71 of 2008: s128(b)(iii). 
141 Nedbank op cite note 34 at 53. 
142 Southern Palace supra note 10 at 24. 
143 Oakedene supra note 60 at 15. 
144 Nedbank op cite note 34 at 51. 
145 Richter supra note 11 at 15. 
146 Gormley v West City Precinct Properties (Pty) Ltd and Another, Anglo Irish Bank Corporation Ltd v West City 
Precinct Properties (Pty) Ltd and Another (19075/11, 15584/11) [2012] ZAWCHC 33 para 3. 
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5. That a company is not operational in liquidation but will be during business 
rescue;147 
6. A major creditor writing off completely or a portion of their claim;148 
7. The business has secured funding.149 
 
The courts approach to these contentions has been quite inflexible. For example, even 
where an applicant could provide valuations that the property to auctioned was worth 
a specific amount the courts could not see how it would yield a better return than in 
business rescue as opposed to a forced sale.150 Our courts have focused on a variety 
of other factors arguing against a liberal approach, such as the fact that a business 
rescue practitioner earns a daily fee compared to a liquidator who earns a percentage 
fee meaning that the proposed costs of business rescue should be considered as a 
factor against there being a reasonable prospect.151 Courts have also accepted a 
creditors intention to oppose the adoption of a business rescue plan as a factor to 
dismiss a business rescue application.152 This approach is highly detrimental to 
business rescue because the process of the actual rescue takes place once a 
business rescue practitioner has been appointed and if the courts do not allow that 
point to even occur the system becomes futile. The judiciary by adopting a liberal 
approach and focusing on the prospects side of the argument as opposed to relying 
on a creditor’s opposition will give effect to the spirit of s7.153 This does not mean that 
a business rescue application is defenceless, it simply means that a valid defence 
                                               
147 Van Staden v Angel Ozone Products CC and Others (54009/11) [2012] ZAGPPHC 328; 2013 (4) SA 630 
(GNP): 41. 
148 Richter supra note 11 at 15. 
149 Richter supra note 11 at 15. 
150 Oakedene supra note 60 at 16. 
151 Nedbank supra note 34 at para 60 and Oakdene supra note 60 at 36. 
152 Oakdene supra note 60 para 37. 
153 Companies Act 71 of 2008: s7. 
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against reasonable prospects should be prejudice suffered by creditors. Factors like a 
creditor’s intention to oppose the adoption of a business plan are factors that are not 
ripe and where courts rely on these factors they imply an unwillingness to trust and 
rely on the procedural safeguards provided for by the Companies Act of 2008. The 
Companies Act 2008 specifically deals with a situation where a business rescue plan 
was objected to and part C of chapter 6 deals with the rights of affected persons.154 If 
the courts do not allow the mechanism to operate and put the cart before the horse 
they would effectively make this mechanism suffer the same fate of judicial 
management.  
 
The enquiry into reasonable prospects is not only done by the courts, in fact there are 
two enquiries into reasonable prospects. The first enquiry is in terms of s131 where a 
court must be satisfied that there is a reasonable prospect of rescuing the company. 
The second enquiry is done by the business rescue practitioner in terms of s141 which 
states that: 
 
‘As soon as practicable after being appointed, a practitioner must investigate 
the company’s affairs, business, property, and financial situation, and after 
having done so, consider whether there is any reasonable prospect of the 
company being rescued.”155  
 
The legislature clearly gave the business rescue practitioner a duty to determine if 
there are reasonable prospects. This duty has specific instructions that require the 
                                               
154 Companies Act 71 of 2008: Chapter 6 Part C. 
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practitioner to examine the affairs, business, property and financial situation and 
implies a thorough investigation. This thorough investigation was not listed in s131 
and all that was referred to was reasonable prospects without giving the courts the 
same specific directions that was given to a business rescue practitioner. This can be 
done for two reasons. Firstly, the main role player in business rescue applications is 
the business rescue practitioner and not the courts and given that a court’s duty is to 
adjudicate over many cases, the amount of available evidence an affected person has 
to present to court is limited which leads to the courts only being able to decide on a 
matter with limited material available. A business rescue practitioner on the other hand 
will be given access to all the material and will be placed in a better position to make 
this determination and will have more time to do so.156 The second reason is that this 
provides for a procedural safeguard in cases where the courts granted business 
rescue and the business rescue practitioner after considering all the affairs, business, 
property and financial situations realizes that there is no reasonable prospect. Upon 
coming to this conclusion the practitioner need not waste time continuing this process 
and can inform the court and all affected person that the company should be 
liquidated.157 The second factor is very important because it is  a measure that 
provides safety for creditors and is a factor the courts should consider when 
adjudicating over business rescue applications.  
 
The creation of s141 should mean that the courts when determining reasonable 
prospects in terms of s131 should do so in a liberal manner because to do so will at 
least allow the main role player a chance to use the system.158 Given that a business 
                                               
156 Companies Act 71 of 2008: Chapter 6 Part D. 
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rescue practitioner would be adequately qualified and trained the ultimate decision of 
whether the company can be turned around using his skill and knowledge should be 
left to his discretion. This creates an element of subjectivity and allows for potential 
abuse by a business rescue practitioner but as was mentioned a liberal interpretation 
will lead to awkward results.159 Another aspect will be the regulation of practitioners 
and sanctions that can deter practitioners abusing their powers.160  
 
The principal of checks and balances allows the judiciary to limit the power of the 
legislature but in this case the judiciary is second guessing chapter 6 of the Companies 
Act 2008.161 The broad purpose of the Companies Act 2008 is to develop South 
Africa’s economy by creating an efficient mechanism to rescue financially distressed 
companies and chapter 6 gives effect to that purpose.162 If the courts  do not reach an 
equilibrium in the test for reasonable prospects the legislature might be forced to make 
an amendment in order to allow business rescue the chance to succeed by expressly 
lowering the standard or giving clear directions on how to interpret it.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
159 Richter supra note 11 at 16. 
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CHAPTER 4: CONSEQUENCES OF ADOPTING A LIBERAL INTERPRETATION 
 
In Richter v ABSA 163 it was contended that a liberal interpretation will have detrimental 
consequences to liquidations and creditors’ interests. The first part of this chapter 
focuses on how creditors’ interests are protected by procedural safeguards. It was 
also accepted in Richter v ABSA that a liberal approach to granting business rescue 
applications when a company is already in liquidation will lead to awkward results.164 
These awkward results are discussed in the second part of this chapter.  
 
4.1 PREJUDICE TO CREDITORS  
4.1.1  THE MORATORIUM  
When a company is in business rescue it enjoys breathing space from creditors 
enforcing claims.165 This statutory moratorium has been referred to as a prohibition of 
all legal proceedings including enforcement action.166 This means that a creditor’s right 
to enforce its claim against a company in business rescue is affected. A creditor suffers 
prejudice by the operation of a moratorium but this prejudice is not arbitrary or without 
remedy as the Companies Act 2008 aims to create an efficient financial rescue regime 
that balances all the rights of stakeholders.167 It is important to note that a creditor does 
not lose its right to claim against a company nor is it suspended during business 
rescue. To say that a moratorium prohibits all legal proceedings or suspends a 
creditors rights during business rescue would be incorrect because a creditor has 
recourse in terms of s133(a) to s133(f).168 It would be correct to follow the approach in 
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166 Redpath and Merchant West supra note 25.  
167 Companies Act 71 of 2008: s7. 
168 Companies Act 71 of 2008: s133. 
 
 
46 
 
Booysen v Jonkheer Boerewynmakery (Pty) Ltd169  which refers to the effect of the 
moratorium on a creditor’s right to claim as a procedural limitation. The procedural 
safeguards in this regard are s133 and s134 of the Companies Act 2008 which provide 
a procedural hurdle that has to be discharged by a creditor before they can enforce 
their claim, furthermore s134 ensures that a secured creditor’s property remain 
protected during business rescue.170 Another procedural safeguard is s132 of the 
Companies Act 2008 which mandates business rescue to be temporary in nature.171  
 
4.1.2 LENGTH OF BUSINESS RESCUE  
Where a company is in liquidation, a liquidator’s duty is to realize the assets of the 
insolvent estate and distribute it to creditors as soon as possible.172 In business rescue 
this is not so, and the business rescue practitioner does not represent the concorsus 
creditorum.173 However, a business rescue practitioner is still placed in a fiduciary role 
and has similar powers like a liquidator.174 This means that if it is uncovered during his 
investigation that there has been fraudulent or reckless trading he can recover the 
amounts from directors or shareholders for loss suffered by the company.  
 
The notion that time is money means that there is a value attached to a creditor waiting 
for a dividend. In a liquidation it might be a few cents on the rand, but it is speedy. In 
business rescue it will take longer and there is no guarantee that the reasonable 
prospects will materialize to render a greater return for a creditor. This means that a 
creditor runs the risk of waiting for business rescue to fail and then receiving a few 
                                               
169 Booysen supra note 24. 
170 Companies Act 71 of 2008: s133-134. 
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172 Insolvency Act 24 of 1936: s82. 
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cents on the rand just as he might have had received if company had been liquidated 
at the outset. The argument on behalf of the creditor is that had they received a few 
cents on the rand from the liquidation before business rescue it would have been of 
more value to them.  
 
The position of an unsecured creditor may be better in business rescue because 
usually where an entity has no assets, creditors are reluctant to prove a claim due to 
the risk of paying a contribution but in business rescue a company is given a lifeline.175 
If business rescue succeeds, then an unsecured creditor has a greater chance of 
receiving a dividend. This is basically the incentive business rescue offers to creditors; 
that business rescue offers the chance of the highest possible return.176 The position 
of creditors waiting to receive what they are legally entitled to is similar to the position 
of a commercial landlord who acquires property for business purposes and seeks to 
evict an unlawful occupier.177 In the PE Municipality case178 the court held: 
Thus, PIE [Prevention of Illegal Eviction From and Unlawful Occupation of Land 
Act 1998] expressly requires the court to infuse elements of grace and 
compassion into the formal structures of the law. It is called upon to balance 
competing interests in a principled way and to promote the constitutional vision 
of a caring society based on good neighbourliness and shared concern. The 
Constitution and PIE confirm that we are not islands unto ourselves. The spirit 
of ubuntu, part of the deep cultural heritage of the majority of the population, 
suffuses the whole constitutional order. It combines individual rights with a 
                                               
175 Ibid at 183. 
176 Bradstreet op cite note 17 at 356. 
177 City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 Ltd and Another (CCT 37/11) 
[2011] ZACC 33: 38. 
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communitarian philosophy. It is a unifying motif of the Bill of Rights, which is 
nothing if not a structured, institutionalised and operational declaration in our 
evolving new society of the need for human interdependence, respect and 
concern.179  
Eviction cases recognize that a person’s occupation is unlawful but still grant that 
person rights in law based on principles and values such as ubuntu.180 This 
compassionate approach can be similar to the liberal approach to handling business 
rescue cases where a creditor does not lose its claim but it is limited during business 
rescue. Eviction cases in terms of the Prevention of Illegal Evictions and Unlawful 
Occupation of Land Act looks at what is just and equitable and takes into account 
various factors to make this determination.181 I am in no way suggesting the right to 
adequate housing is as important as the rights of a company in business rescue but 
only that the judiciary can adopt a similar approach to handling business rescue cases. 
A creditor will definitely suffer prejudice the longer the amounts owed to it are 
outstanding but the courts in eviction cases have held that values and principles simply 
require a lessor to tolerate an unlawful occupier for a certain period of time and not 
indefinitely. If South African company law shifts to this compassionate substantive 
approach that takes African principles of law such as ubuntu into company law then 
creditors might have to accept that business rescue is only temporary and the time 
frames specified in s133 are a procedural safeguard.182 This allows judicial oversight 
after 3 months to ensure that the process has not lost its reasonable prospects and 
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gives creditors an opportunity to oppose any application for an extension by the 
business rescue practitioner. 
4.1.3 POST COMMENCEMENT FINANCE  
This is a system that aims at encouraging persons to invest money in a company in 
business rescue in the hope that the company regains financial stability to pay back 
the loans.183 The issues surrounding post commencement finance are the ranking of 
claims which places creditors who provide post commencement finance only second 
to the costs and fees of the business rescue practitioner.184 It is obvious that this was 
done as an incentive for persons to invest in companies in business rescue but the 
problem is that it makes a pre commencement creditor feel as if the post 
commencement creditors have jumped the queue. On the other hand, a pre-
commencement creditor might recognize that the post commencement creditor is 
taking a greater risk which may benefit both types of creditors if the reasonable 
prospects materialize. However, if the reasonable prospects don’t materialize then the 
new creditor outranks the old one. Given that the incentive is serving a legitimate 
purpose it’s hard to expect any other way to get a person to throw good money after 
bad money and take such a risk. This means creditors will have to rely on the 
procedural safeguards which are s134 of the Companies Act 2008 and voting at the 
adoption of a business rescue plan.185  
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4.1.4 A BUSINESS RESCUE PLAN 
The rescuing of a company takes place in the business rescue plan. It will be fair to 
term the business rescue plan as the most important part of the process because it 
will specify what is to be done to rescue the company. Creditors play a role in 
developing this plan and eventually have a say on its implementation.186 Once a plan 
has been created the business rescue practitioner will convene a meeting with the 
creditors and persons with a right to vote on its implementation.187 At this meeting each 
creditor will have a vote equal to their interests on whether to adopt the business 
rescue plan or not.188 This is another procedural safeguard that makes sure the 
creditors have a say in their interests. The position changes when a plan is rejected 
because a business rescue practitioner is empowered to apply to court to set aside 
the vote rejecting the plan on the grounds that it was inappropriate.189 This means that 
a creditor has a luxury of choice but that choice must be exercised in an appropriate 
manner which is problematic because different creditors have different interests to 
protect. Another safeguard that seeks to balance the goals of business rescue with 
creditors interests are the provisions dealing with binding offer.190 Section 153 holds 
that where a plan has been rejected any affected person may make a binding offer to 
those affected persons who voted against the adoption of the business rescue plan. 
The words ‘binding offer’ were interpreted in African Banking Corporation of Botswana 
v Kariba Furniture Manufacturer & Others,191  but this study does not delve further into 
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procedural safeguards other than noting them as a factor that should be considered 
by a court.  
 
4.1.5 BUSINESS RESCUE PRACTITIONER ABUSING HIS POWERS  
The fees of a business rescue practitioner are prescribed by a tariff prepared by the 
Minister of the Department of Trade and Industry in the regulations of the Companies 
Act 2008.192 The fees are charged per day and this means that the longer business 
rescue continues the greater the fees.193 This approach seems counterproductive as 
opposed to a flat rate, percentage-based fee or success fee. In practice a company 
through one or more of its directors or shareholders may attempt to frustrate creditors 
by applying for business rescue and seeking an order that a business rescue 
practitioner who they are close to be appointed. In these instances a business rescue 
practitioner may fail to comply with his duties and delay the process.194 In situations 
where a business rescue practitioner fails to comply with their fiduciary duties and act 
mala fide, creditors can apply for the removal of that business rescue practitioner.195 
The proof required to prove that a business rescue practitioner has acted contrary to 
what was required of him is quite simple given the procedural requirements he has to 
follow. This means that the framework has provided a procedural safeguard which 
requires strict compliance by the business rescue practitioner that takes the form of a 
step by step approach and where the practitioner does not follow the sequence 
prescribed, he can be removed by a court order.196 The way the framework operates 
is that it allows a business rescue practitioner enough room to exercise his wide range 
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of powers but there are always steps that have to be followed and where this is not 
done creditors have recourse to the courts. In addition to this remedy, creditors who 
suffer damages as a result of the business rescue practitioner’s negligence, can claim 
same from the practitioner directly.  
 
4.2 AWKWARD CONSEQUENCES OF A LIBERAL APPROACH TO 
REASONABLE PROSPECTS AFTER A FINAL ORDER OF LIQUIDATION 
 
4.2.1 THE LOCUS STANDI OF EMPLOYEES 
Once a company has been placed in liquidation an affected person has locus standi 
to apply to court for an order placing the company in business rescue.197 Employees 
of a company qualify as affected persons. In Richter v ABSA198 the applicant was a 
general manager employed by the company who had made application to court 6 
months after the final order of liquidation had been granted. The case has been 
criticized by Loubser 199 who argues that the court respectfully failed to consider s38(9) 
of the Insolvency Act. Section 38(1) of the Insolvency Act suspends all contracts of 
employment between the Insolvent entity and its employees.200 The suspension 
continues until it is automatically terminated after 45 days of the liquidator being 
appointed or before 45 days should the liquidator terminate the contract expressly in 
terms of s38(4).201 These two situations raise an issue for employees who desire to 
apply for an order placing the company under business because the Insolvency Act 
regards the employment relationship as terminated.  
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The court a quo in Richter v ABSA202  had to decide whether an employee had locus 
standi as an affected as an issue in limine. The court examined the effect of s38 of the 
Insolvency Act and held that the contracts of employment are only suspended and not 
terminated. The court then went on to decide that the real issue is not whether the 
employment contract was suspended but rather whether the employee’s status as an 
affected person was terminated. This approach means that where a contract of 
employment has been terminated either automatically or by the liquidator an employee 
will not lose its right to institute action in terms of s131 of the Companies Act 2008.  
 
The court a quo held that chapter 14 of Companies Act 1973 still applies when winding 
up companies and that it holds that the law of insolvency applies mutatis mutandis 
when a company can’t pay its debts.203 If a court were to follow this strict approach 
and apply the law as it is mentioned, it would certainly mean an employee loses its 
right to sue after their contracts are terminated. The word ‘terminate’ implies something 
has come to an end and it would be very difficult to criticize this approach. However, 
the courts when determining whether an employee whose contract of employment has 
terminated has locus standi might consider adopting a broad approach to s128. A 
court can interpret that there is an employment relationship or that there was one that 
has been terminated ex lege and for the purposes of s128(1)(a) an employee who’s 
right has been terminated still has locus standi. This approach can be similar to the 
Labour Appeal Courts broad interpretation of who an employee is.204 The court in 
Richter v Bloempro205 took the view that the contracts were only suspended and not 
terminated and thus the employee had locus standi. 
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4.2.2 WHO IS IN CONTROL OF THE COMPANY  
An awkward result of business rescue after liquidation can be the control of a 
company. When a company is in liquidation a liquidator is in control of the company, 
but that position changes the moment a business rescue application is made.206 There 
have been various different interpretations on when a business rescue application is 
made and there is now general acceptance once the application has been filed in court 
and served on the affected parties the application has been made.207  This 
interpretation would mean a liquidator’s powers are suspended until the court has 
adjudicated over the application. This period from the time the application is made to 
the court deciding the application causes uncertainty as to who is in control of the 
company. 
 
 In cases where a company is in business rescue and a creditor successfully applies 
for the company to be placed in liquidation and that decision is appealed the courts 
have adopted the historic creditor friendly approach and held the estate vests with the 
liquidators pending the appeal.208 This approach is contrary to the purpose of business 
rescue and has been criticized by other cases such Lawrence Maroos v GCC 
Engineering209 where the court appointed an independent person to control the 
company pending a final order of liquidation when a company was already in business 
rescue and the provincial order of liquidation had been granted.  
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The general approach of the judiciary is that there is a lacuna in the law due to 
business rescue being new in our law.210 This current lacuna caused by a business 
rescue application being made after a company was already in liquidation was dealt 
with in Janse Van Rensburg v Cardio Fitness Properties (Pty) Ltd211 where a liquidator 
sought a spoliation remedy to take back control of the assets of a company in 
liquidation during the period between the business rescue application being made and 
the business rescue application being decided. The court held that while the liquidation 
proceedings have been suspended the intention of the legislature was to stop the 
process of liquidation and it did not mean that the provincial liquidator’s duties to simply 
take control and preserve the assets are suspended.212 This approach cannot be a 
one size fits all solutions because it dealt with provisional liquidators and the court 
recognized that the provisional liquidator’s duties are to preserve the assets until a 
final liquidator is appointed. This means such an approach would not be tenable once 
final liquidators are appointed and a business rescue application is made.   
 
4.2.3 BUSINESS RESCUE AFTER BUSINESS RESCUE  
Section 131(1) states’ 
“Unless a company has adopted a resolution contemplated in section 129, an affected 
person may apply to a court at any time for an order placing the company under 
supervision and commencing business rescue proceedings.”  
Our courts have interpreted s131(1) to mean that a company cannot be ordered to be 
placed in business rescue whilst it is already in business rescue in terms of s129 but 
this does not prevent the courts from adopting other interpretations. For example, a 
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court can interpret this section to mean that when a company has already filed a 
resolution to commence business rescue and the regime has failed it automatically 
bars any further court application by an affected person.  
 
A liberal approach to business rescue may allow for business rescue applications to 
succeed in cases where previous business rescue applications have been dismissed 
or the previous business rescue had failed. Currently the most liberal approach can 
be seen in Richter v ABSA213 which can be classified as the third generation of cases 
which shifts the attitude of the courts to being debtor friendly. Courts have previously 
considered why the company did not voluntarily file for business rescue as a factor 
when an application for business rescue is brought. This can be a factor where a 
company through its directors or shareholders had been acting with an ulterior motive 
and can cause a court to apply its discretion even when all the requirements off s131 
are met and dismiss the application.214 In cases where innocent employees or 
creditors apply for business rescue, the courts might not consider this as a negative 
factor but rather as a positive one which will allow a business rescue practitioner the 
opportunity to investigate the affairs and reclaim any amounts from directors or 
shareholders who have been trading recklessly.  
 
The point which is made is that a factor might be relevant but more so to a specific 
affected person. This approach will support the view that whenever there are new facts 
that have arisen an affected person can make an application for business rescue 
notwithstanding the fact that business rescue applications have previously been made 
                                               
213 Richter supra note 11. 
214 Nedbank supra note 34 at 23. 
 
 
57 
 
or that the company which is now in liquidation had already been under business 
rescue.215 Currently there exists no case where a company had been under business 
rescue and then while in liquidation new facts have arisen to warrant another business 
rescue application. Richter v ABSA216 provides a nice base from which business 
rescue jurisprudence can be built from as its approach has opened many doors for the 
courts to deal with.  
 
The contention in Richter v ABSA217 was that if courts adopt such a liberal approach 
to business rescue applications then there exists potential for the system to be 
abused.218 This submission is warranted and makes sense because our insolvency 
law has been previously abused by debtors who have used friendly sequestrations as 
a means of escaping debts and frustrating creditors.219 The SCA held that while 
potential for abuse does exist it should not mean a court should use that as a factor to 
deny business rescue after liquidation and should affected persons abuse the system 
by bringing frivolous applications then the courts are empowered to make a punitive 
cost order.220   
 
4.2.4 LIQUIDATOR’S AND BUSINESS RESCUE PRACTITIONER’S CLAIMS  
 
When a company in liquidation is placed in business rescue the liquidator becomes a 
concurrent creditor in business rescue.221 This consequence has a negative side and 
a positive side. The negative side is from the perspective of a liquidator, who will have 
a vote equal to his claim in business rescue. Given that a liquidator’s fees are a 
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percentage of the gross amount of the estate it is most likely that his voting rights are 
very small in business rescue. The positive side is from the perspective of the 
company in financial distress as a company has a useful bargaining tool when it’s in 
liquidation. The study has primarily looked at the value of business rescue as a regime 
to rescue a company but perhaps for a company that is already in liquidation it can be 
a useful threat or bargaining tool that can encourage a compromise with creditors. A 
liquidator represents the creditors interests, but the threat of a business rescue 
application can quickly force a liquidator to consider where his own fees will come 
from, especially in the event of a company relying on the second objective of business 
rescue. Where a company has successfully applied for business rescue and a 
business rescue plan giving effect to selling off the company assets to achieve a 
greater return for creditors should send alarm bells to liquidators. Business rescue 
balances the playing fields and does not allow liquidators to act in a draconian manner 
and almost forces creditors to bargain before a liquidator incurs further costs of having 
to defend a business rescue application.  
 
The ranking of claims in business rescue was established in Merchant West222 as 
follows: 
1. The practitioner, for remuneration and expenses, and other persons (including 
legal and other professionals) for costs of business rescue proceedings. 
2. Employees for any remuneration which became due and payable after business 
rescue proceedings began. 
                                               
222 Supra note 25 at 21. 
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3. Secured lenders or other creditors for any loan or supply made after business 
rescue proceedings began, i.e. post-commencement finance. 
4. Unsecured lenders or other creditors for any loan or supply made after business 
rescue proceedings began, i.e. post-commencement finance. 
5. Secured lenders or other creditors for any loan or supply made before business 
rescue proceedings began. 
6. Employees for any remuneration which became due and payable before business 
rescue proceedings began. 
7. Unsecured lenders or other creditors for any loan or supply made before business 
rescue proceedings began.223 
This does raise concerns for a liquidator who falls under a concurrent creditor, but this 
situation can quickly change should the company go back into liquidation and business 
rescue fails. Where a business rescue practitioner has not received his fees in 
business rescue and the company is back in liquidation he now becomes a concurrent 
creditor.224 This balances the playing fields because it motivates liquidators and 
business rescue practitioners to do their best and they can be seen as being forced to 
do so because they now both have something to lose. This system means that there 
is greater room for negotiating and bargaining and allows an atmosphere conducive 
to compromise and settlements in terms of s155 of the Companies Act 2008.225 This 
is why business rescue is not creditor unfriendly because all it creates is a friendlier 
atmosphere between the stakeholders to a company in liquidation as opposed to a 
hostile creditor friendly approach that sees a liquidator as a creature of statute 
                                               
223 Ibid  
224 Diener N.O v Minister of Justice (926/2016) [2017] ZASCA 180. 
225 Companies Act 71 of 2008: s155. 
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performing the tasks of getting the company assets and selling it for the benefit of 
creditors. With the creation of business rescue, liquidators will now be more willing to 
advise creditors of entering into s155 compromises due to the threat of upcoming 
business rescue applications that could stall creditors receiving any dividends for a 
few months.  
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
 
Business rescue has proved to be successful for certain companies such as the Moyo 
Group which was in the restaurant industry.226 These cases create a better picture of 
business rescue and its potential in law and economics. The creation of business 
rescue does not just create a workout for financially distressed companies but also 
has the potential to inspire a quasi-venture capitalist industry where companies can 
invest in financially distressed companies or outright buy the company at a discount 
and pay off the debts and thereafter sell the company for a profit.227  
 
This is an indication that the system has worked and if courts adopt a liberal threshold 
it can work for many other financially distressed companies. One of the concerns is 
that the economic climate can change very quickly and can be compared to a set of 
dominoes because when we allow one company in financial distress a period of respite 
from creditor claims, we can cause those very same creditors to become financially 
distressed. This is an important principle because business rescue is aimed at 
empowering South Africa’s economy as a whole and if we adopt an approach that 
becomes too debtor friendly, we may end up in an economy filled with revolving 
debt.228 This is why the interpretation of the term ‘reasonable prospects’ is very 
important because the need for an equilibrium that balances the rights of all 
                                               
226 Fin 24 ‘Purchaser Found for Moyo Business Rescue’ 2014 
https://www.fin24.com/Companies/Retail/Purchaser-found-for-moyo-business-rescue-20140330. Accessed on 
18th October 2018. 
227 ENCA ‘Buyers of distressed South African businesses likely to emerge’ 2016 
https://www.enca.com/money/buyers-of-distressed-south-african-businesses-likely-to-emerge. Accessed on 18th 
October 2018. 
228 Companies Act 71 of 2008: s7. 
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stakeholders is vital for legal certainty and economic growth. The ultimate aim is to 
establish a test that is pro creditor and pro debtor.229  
 
To achieve this test the stigma associated with financial distress and rescuing a 
company would need to change. There are reasons for creditors to be concerned 
when a company seeks to be rescued but it may not necessary be a bad thing as an 
alternative to liquidation. Creditors would need to be on board with business rescue 
and trust in the system and this is why the system needs to be corrected so there can 
be legal certainty. This can only take place once chapter 6 has been judicially ironed 
out so the legal profession can advise both creditors and debtors on what the law 
prescribes as opposed to having creditor resistance to business rescue and legal 
practitioners testing the courts to answer questions where there is uncertainty. The 
two ways this can be done are to let the courts slowly answer and develop Chapter 6 
of the Companies Act 2008 or to amend the Act. Given that the duty of creating the 
law is that of the legislature and that business rescue is definitely going to be a part of 
South African law for a long time I would recommended that Companies Act 2008 be 
amended.  
 
Judicial exploration with the term ‘reasonable prospects’ should not be repeated in 
business rescue as this term has already been examined. Business rescue is often 
referred to in case law as being new in South African law, but I disagree. Business 
rescue might be relatively new in the sense that it was enacted in 2011, but the concept 
of corporate rescue is not. Furthermore, the uncertainty in South Africa’s economy has 
                                               
229 E Levenstein ‘An appraisal of the new South African business rescue procedure’ (unpublished LLD thesis, 
University of Pretoria, 2016) 641. 
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caused an influx of business rescue applications which means the courts are regularly 
dealing with the provisions of chapter 6 of the Companies Act 2008. Business rescue 
and the uncertainty regarding ‘reasonable prospects’ cannot be said to be a new 
concept anymore as business rescue applications are a frequent visitor in South 
African courts and have been visiting regularly since its operation. Academics have 
recommended that special courts should be created to handle business rescue and 
liquidations, but this is unnecessary because the Companies Act provides that Courts 
may appoint a specialized judge to preside over business rescue applications.230  
 
There is a shift towards a liberal approach by the judiciary but the process of the courts 
slowly finding its feet is an indication that the framework of chapter 6 was insufficient.  
The legislature should consider creating a guiding provision that mandates the courts 
to consider certain factors when tasked with adjudicating business rescue 
applications. In order to create a workable, pragmatic and liberal test for business 
rescue the legislature should consider defining the term and/or even mandating courts 
to consider certain factors when making a determination on reasonable prospects.  
 
I propose the following amendments: 
A definition of reasonable prospects as an allegation backed up by facts that if given 
the chance to materialize may result in one or more of the following objectives of 
business rescue and includes but is not limited to: 
a) A creditor writing off a substantial claim 
b) The company being awarded a contract  
c) The company securing finance  
                                               
230 Levenstein op cite note 229 at 590. 
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d) The company being sold as a going concern  
 
The decision on whether there is a ‘reasonable prospects’ is a question of law that is 
inferred from facts. Therefore, it is important that an Applicant display facts to back the 
allegation that there is a reasonable prospect. The weight attached by a court to these 
facts can cause uncertainty, therefore a further amendment guiding a court in this 
enquiry should also be considered by the legislature. A provision such as: 
A court when determining reasonable prospects must consider; 
a) the type of company and its size; 
b) the amount of debts outstanding compared against the prospects relied 
on; 
c) any prejudice to creditors and the degree of such prejudice; 
d) that a business rescue practitioner will conduct a thorough inquiry into 
reasonable prospects if the application is successful in terms of s141. 
 
The legislature should also consider amending s131 as follows: 
“Unless a company has adopted a resolution contemplated in section 129, an 
affected person may apply to a court at any time so long as the company is not 
already in business rescue for an order placing the company under supervision 
and commencing business rescue proceedings.” 
 
This will remove any ambiguity when interpreting whether a company is capable of 
being placed in business rescue after it had filed a resolution in terms of s129 and the 
process had failed, became a nullity or was converted to a liquidation.  
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The legislature should also consider an amendment specifying who is in control of the 
company because a lacuna is created by s131(6) where liquidation is suspended by 
a business rescue application. An amendment should provide for who is in control of 
the company during the period from when the application is made till the court’s 
decision. The amendment should provide for an independent curator or that the 
provisional or final liquidators remain in control but may not dispose of any property 
similar to the way in which an appeal on the final order of liquidation operates that 
allows a liquidator to conduct his duties but may not dispose of any property in the 
estate pending the decision by the appeal court.  
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